Volume 61

Issue 4

Article 3

June 1959

Some Aspects of Tort Liability in the Mining of Coal
Robert Tucker Donley
West Virginia University College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
Part of the Oil, Gas, and Mineral Law Commons, and the Torts Commons

Recommended Citation
Robert T. Donley, Some Aspects of Tort Liability in the Mining of Coal, 61 W. Va. L. Rev. (1959).
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol61/iss4/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research Repository @
WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The Research
Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.

Donley: Some Aspects of Tort Liability in the Mining of Coal

SOME ASPECTS OF TORT LIABILITY IN
THE MINING OF COAL.*
ROBERT

T

TucamR DoNI=**

purpose of this article is to discuss four types of cases involving tort liability in connection with the mining of coal and to
examine the question of whether liability in cases of this character
should be based upon negligence, or whether the doctrine of absolute liability should apply.
HE

I.

THE USE OF EXPLOSIVES

The first type of case involves the question of the liability of a
coal operator in the mining of coal, for example, in strip mining, who
finds it necessary to set off explosives, and by reason thereof the
force of the concussion is transmitted through the strata or through
the air, resulting in damage to neighboring property.
The majority of the decisions in this country support the rule
of absolute liability in such cases, irrespective of whether or not
there is a physical invasion of the plaintiff's property by the casting
of rocks, debris and the like onto such property, or on the other
hand, the invasion of plaintff's property occurs by shocks and concussions only.'
The minority view2 is based upon the theory that if the coal operator has no other way by which to extract the coal and uses no
more explosive than is reasonably necessary for the task and conducts the blasting in a careful manner, that is to say, with all the
precautions which are possible to be taken, then there is no liability.
* This article is the text of an address delivered before the West Virginia
Judicial Association at the annual meeting in Huntington, West Virginia, on

October 20, 1958.

** Professor of Law, West Virginia University; formerly a Judge of the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia; member of the Monongalia County
Bar. 1
See Annot, 92 A.L.R. 741 (1934); Brown v. Lunder Constr. Co., 240
Wis. 122,2 N.W.2d 859 (1942); Jones v. Oman, 28 Tenn. App. 1, 184 S.W.2d
568 (1944); City of Knoxville v. Peebles, 19 Tenn. App. 340, 87 S.W.2d 1022
(1935); Baler v. Glen Alden Coal Co., 131 Pa. Super. 309, 200 AUt.
190 (1938); Baker v. Healy Co., 302 l. App. 634, 24 N.E.2d 228 (1939);
Bluhm v. Blanck & Gargaro, Inc., 62 Ohio App. 451, 24 N.E.2d 615 (1939);
Stocker v. City of Richmond Heights, 235 Mo. App. 277, 132 S.W.2d 1116
(St. Louis Ct. of App. 1939); McGrath v. Basick Bros. Constr. Co., 7 Cal. Dist.
Ct. of App. 573, 46 P.2d 981 (1935); 35 C.J.S. Explosives 238 (1943); 3 BESTATEMNT, TORTS § 519, pp. 4148 (1938); H"PER, TORTS §§ 202, 204

(1933); Note, 45 HAnv. L. REv. 594 (1932).
2 See Annot., 92 A.L.R. 471 (1934).
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There appears to be no authority directly in point in West
Virginia. The blasting cases are not, as sometimes supposed, based
upon the application of the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher,3 for the
reason that the blasting is done intentionally; whereas, under the
Rylands v. Fletcher doctrine the instrumentality causing the damages accidentally escapes. Nor is this a case of "nuisance", as in
cases involving the detonation of stored explosives, in which the
courts impose an absolute liability, nor is the matter governed by
the rule of res ipsa loquitur, which is a mere rule of evidence and
4
not a rule of substantive law.
It is submitted that the doctrine of absolute liability should be
applied, for it is little comfort to a plaintiff whose property has been
brought down about his ears to deny him recovery by answering
that while the defendant admits having destroyed the plaintiff's
property, he was very careful when he did it. It is socially desirable
to require industries engaged in dangerous activities to distribute
the loss by providing insurance, rather than to shift it upon the
blameless neighbor. The basis of liability is the extraordinary,
hazardous nature of the defendant's conduct and a sound public
policy demands that the actor assume the risk.
II. STM POLMION
The second phase of tort liability in connection with the mining
of coal concerns injury to property arising from stream pollution.5
Liability for Injuries to Property. Much confusion and diversity of opinion have arisen concerning the joint or separate liability
of coal operators who, acting independently of each other, discharge waste material into a stream, which is carried by the water
and deposited on the land of a lower riparian owner. In 1906, the
West Virginia court held, in Day v. Louisville Coal & Coke Co.,0
that any one of the operators is liable separately for the entire damage. In 1909, the Virginia court held the opposite, in PulaskiAnthracite Coal Co. v. Gibboney Sand Bar Co.,1 without mentioning the
Day case. In 1912, in an action in Virginia against several producers
3 L.R. 3 H.L. 830 (1868). See Dickinson, The Rylands v. Fletcher Rule in
West Virginia, 30 W. 'VA. L.Q. 248 (1924).
4 See Holley v. Purity Baking Co., 128 W. Va. 531, 37 8.E.2d 729 (1946).
5 The text of the discussion here is a reprint from DONLE:Y, LAW OF COAL,
OIL & GAS IN W. VA. & VA. § 178 (1951), and is printed here with the consent of the publisher, The Michie Com pany, Charlottesville, Va.
6 60 V. Va. 27, 53 S.E. 776 (1906).
7 110 Va. 444, 66 S.E. 73 (1909).
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of iron pyrites, the trial court in Arminius Chemical Co. v. Ladrum8
instructed the jury that if it were impossible to determine in what
proportions the defendants had contributed to the injuries, then each
who had contributed in any degree is responsible for the whole injury. The Supreme Court said that "Whether the rule announced in
Pulaski Anthracite Coal Co. v. Gibboney, supra, would control,
where it is impossible to determine in what proportion each of several wrongdoers had contributed to the injury complained of, need
not be considered in this case, since the instruction given was not
objected to by the defendants." Further, in commenting upon the
Pulaski case, the court said that the authorities were not in harmony,
and cited the Day case as sustaining the contrary view. In 1916, in
Carolina,C. E. 0. Ry. v. Hill,9 the Virginia court indicated that the
doctrine of the Pulaski case is limited to cases involving stream pollution and that "The doctrine is thoroughly established that where
there are several concurrent negligent causes, the effects of which are
not separable, though due to independent authors, either of which is
sufficient to produce -theentire loss, all are jointly or severally liable
for the entire loss," citing the Arminius case. The latest decision in
Virginia is that of Panther Coal Co. v. Looney,lo which holds that a
coal operator does not have the legal right to pollute a stream, in a
material and substantial way, by permitting mine water to drain
into it, so as to damage -thelands of a lower riparian owner, citing
both the Pulaski and Arminius cases. In the meantime, in 1920, in
Farley v. Crystal Coal Co.," the West Virginia court overruled the
Day case in so far as it authorized the joinder of defendants, and
imposed liability upon one of them for the entire damage, citing in
support of its decision the Pulaski case, but not mentioning the Arminius case.
The qualification mentioned in the Carolina case that the act of
any one of the tort-feasors be sufficient to produce the entire loss
would, it is submitted, impose liability upon the basis of probabilities
rather than upon the basis of proof which, as a practical matter, it
is impossible to obtain. Perhaps in the great majority of instances
no one can determine with any degree of certainty how much pollution was contributed by any one operator, and the indication in Virginia is that he is not liable for the injury unless it be shown that his
contribution was sufficient to produce the entire loss-an entirely
8 118 Va. 7, 78 S.E. 459 (1912).
9 119 Va. 416, 89 S.E. 902 (1916).
10 185 Va. 758, 40 S.E.2d 298 (1946).
1185 W. Va. 595, 102 S.E. 265 (1920).
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different proposition from whether it did, in fact, produce the entire,

or any part of, the loss. It would seem that, in principle, each operator should be liable only for such share of the damage as he contributed. But, as a practical matter, how can the landowner prove
that fact with any degree of certainty? Even if it were possible to
prove the exact amount of debris deposited in the stream by each
operator-for example, if each of four operators deposited the same
number of tons in the stream in a given period-it would not inexorably follow that each is liable for one-fourth of the damage, because the amount deposited on the plaintiffs land is not necessarily
the amount placed in the stream. As a physical fact, some of the
material deposited by the operator farthest up the stream would
sink to the bottom or be deposited elsewhere before reaching the
plaintiff's land. Unless, then, the courts are prepared to adopt a rule
of thumb to the effect that proof of the amount of polluting matter
deposited in the stream is, in the absence of evidence to the contrary,
sufficient proof of the amount deposited on the plaintiff's land, there
would seem to be no way in which the landowner can establish a
case, in an action at law which does not rest upon mere speculation
and probability. Of course, these considerations would not prevent
the granting of an injunction to restrain the operators from depositing the material, by way of the stream, upon the plaintiff's land.
And it may be that a court of equity having taken jurisdiction for
that purpose, would give complete relief by requiring a discovery
of the amount of polluting material placed in the stream by each operator, and-applying the suggested rule of thumb-award damages.
Whether this would be an unconstitutional deprivation of the right
of trial by jury is a problem beyond the scope of this inquiry. In
summary, therefore, it may be said that the cases are in a confusing,
if not irreconcilable, state and that the theoretical right of the landowner to recover proportionate damages separately from each contributing operator may well-nigh be unenforceable by reason of
insurmountable difficulties of proof.
In the case of G. L. Webster Co. v. Steelman, 2 the defendant discharged waste from its canning operations into a stream at a point
approximately 2.69 miles from the property of the plaintiff. The
waste material was deposited on the property of the plaintiff and in
the waters surrounding him, resulting in the production of very offensive odors, and making the property of the plaintiff virtually uninhabitable.
32 172

Va. 342, 1 S.E.2d 305 (1939).
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The plaintiff contended that in the absence of negligence it was
not liable for damages, and its acts in discharging waste matter were
the exercise, in a lawful manner, of its rights and that any loss occasioned thereby was damnum absque injuria.
The plaintiffs proceeding was a notice of motion for judgment,
which contained no allegation of negligence, and the plaintiff did not
attempt to prove negligence upon the part of the defendant, the
whole theory of the plaintiff's case being that the drainage system
created a nuisance.
The court said: "Odors which are offensive and disagreeable in
such a manner as to render life uncomfortable and damage property
rights constitute a nuisance.... [ Citing authorities. ] In the creation
of a nuisance, it appears to be generally settled that the question of
negligence or reasonable care is immaterial.... [Citing authorities.]
In Virginia, we follow the general rule that it is not necessary to allege or prove negligence when the acts complained of result from
a nuisance committed by another in a private capacity.... [Citing
authorities.]"
The court, continuing, quoted from Minor, Vol. 1 of the Law
of Real Property as follows: "It is to be observed that, whatever
the rights of the upper proprietor may be with respect to the drainage of surface-water, the authorities seem agreed upon the proposition that he has no right to pollute it while on his land and then allow
it to drain, even in natural channels, upon his neighbor's land, and
he is liable for injuries to the latter caused thereby-even, it seems,
though he be guilty of no negligence."'
III.

SUPPORT OF OVERLYING STRATA

The third phase of liability concerns the duty to protect superincumbent seams of coal, and the duty of both the lessor and the
lessee to support the overlying strata.13
Lessee's Duty to Protect Superincumbent Seams of Coal.
Where there has been a severance of title to the surface from the
title to two seams of coal, the problems of support for the superincumbent seam may be classified as follows:
13 The material in this section is a reprint from the writer's Coal Leases,
Title XVI in AummcAN LAW OF MruNG, now in manuscript form, and is

printed here by permission of the publisher, Matthew Bender & Co., New

York, N.Y.
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(1)

Both seams are owned by the same lessor and

(a) The lessor leases both seams to the same lessee by one
instrument. In such a case, where the lessee mines in the lower
seam and removes supporting pillars in such a way as to cause the
seepage of water into the upper seam, resulting in the loss of recoverable coal. therefrom, the lessor is entitled to an injunction against
further removal of support, and to an accounting for damages sustained. 14 The principle applied is that there is an implied covenant
that the lessee will do nothing and leave nothing undone which is
reasonably necessary to protect the premises against waste and destruction. The lease could, of course, contain an express waiver of
support which would discharge that duty, 15 but it is highly improbable that the lessor would so agree. The duty to support the upper
seam continues until all the minable and merchantable coal therein
has been removed by the lessee, or by the lessor after the term of the
lease has expired. 16
(b) The lessor leases each seam to different lessees. If the
lessee of the lower seam operates in a negligent manner so as to
make it impossible to mine the upper seam, the lessee of the latter
17
And,
may recover damages from -the lessee of the lower seam.
although the first lease is of the lower seam, if the lessor does not
expressly or by necessary implication waive the right to support of
the upper seam, and thereafter leases it to another lessee, the latter
may enjoin the lessee of the lower seam from removing it in such a
18
This is
manner as to interfere with operations in the upper seam.
would
lessor
the
that
incredible
it
is
a sound conclusion because
intend
did
if
he
Or,
seam.
consent to the destruction of the upper
of the
lease
the
in
to do so, that intention must be clearly expressed
14 Goodykoontz v. White Star Mining Co., 94 W. Va. 654, 119 S.E. 862

(1923).

While there are expressions in this case indicating that the liability
would seem that mining in the manner

of the lessee is based upon negligence, it

stated constitutes negligence per se. Other statements in the case indicate that
the liability is an absolute one. It is submitted that this is the correct view.
See also, Genet v. Delaware & H. Consol. Co., 136 N.Y. 593, 82 N.E. 1078
(1893), in which the lease covered three seams of coal. The lessee mined
in the middle seam in such a negligent manner as to cause subsidence of the
overlying seam, making further mining impossible. The lessee was held
liable for the minimum royalties plus damages for the loss of the coal which
could have been mined but for such destruction.
15 Goodykoontz v. White Star Mining Co., supra note 14.
16 ibid.
17Yandes v. Wright, 66 Ind. 319, 32 Am. Rep. 109 (1879).
18 Pennsylvania Coal & Coke Co. v. Duncan-Spangler Coal Co., 333 Pa.
272, 3 A.2d 256 (1939).
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lower seam. 19 And, the right of the lessee of the upper seam to its
support cannot be divested or changed by a subsequent lease of the
lower seam, or by modification of the original lease thereof, for the
reason that the lessor's right to support passes to the lessee of the
20
upper seam as an incident of the grant of the leasehold estate.
(2) Each seam is owned by a different party. If the lessor
owns the lower seam only and as appurtenant thereto there has been
an express waiver of subjacent support of all the overlying strata
(including, therefore, all superincumbent coal), the lessee is under
no duty to support the latter even though the mining of the lower
seam will result in the complete loss and destruction of the upper
seam.

21

It is apparent that if the seams are owned by different parties it
must be determined from the severance deeds whether the owner of
the lower seam has secured a release or a waiver of the duty to support the upper seam. If so, he can confer that privilege upon his
lessee and he would ordinarily do so either expressly or by implication. In this type of case, the release or waiver is of a "natural right"
to subjacent support and has nothing to do with the theory of an
implied covenant.
Duty of Lessor and Lessee to Support Overlying Strata. There
will now be considered the duty of the lessee to the lessor to support
all the overlying strata and the liability of the lessor or of the lessee,
or both, for failure to provide subjacent support for overlying strata
which is owned by a third person.
A. As between lessee and lessor, the problem may be divided into
two situations:
(1) The lessor is the owner of the seam of coal only. The duty
of the lessor to provide support for the overlying strata must be de19Ibid. In this case, the lease of the lower seam granted specifically
enumerated rights to use and occupy the surface, "being the mining rights,
privileges and grants so full and complete as the same are contained in the
several Deeds of conveyance from the original owners to the said Lessor."
The court held that this provision referred only to the surface rights and was
not a release, by reference, of the duty to support the upper seam.
20
Ibid.
21

Continental Coal Co. v. Connellsville By-Products Coal Co., 104 W. Va.
44, 138 S.E. 787 (1927). Although this decision has been destructively criticized in Note, 34 W. VA. L.Q. 212 (1928), it is submitted that it is correct.
The subsequent purchaser of the overlying seam takes it with notice of the
prior waiver of subjacent support concerning it.
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termined by reference to the deed of severance.2 2 If, as appurtenant
to the ownership of the coal, or otherwise,2 3 the lessor has secured a
release or waiver of the duty to provide subjacent support, it inures
to the benefit of the lessee in the absence of a provision in the lease
to the contrary. Normally, there would be no such provision in
the lease because the lessor would be desirous of effecting a full
recovery of the coal and would have no interest in the support of the
surface.
(2) The lessor is the owner of both the coal and the overlying
strata. In this situation, the lessor may or may not desire to have
the surface supported, depending upon its character, location and
suitability for useful purposes in the future. In either case, the
duty of the lessee to provide support depends entirely upon the
terms of the lease. Thus, where the lease contains an express waiver
of support, the lessee is under no duty to furnish it,2 4 and such
waiver is not affected by a provision in the lease giving the lessor
permission to inspect the mine and to designate where pillars are to
be left.25 And, where the lease requires the lessee to mine and pay
for all the coal in the demised premises and exempts the lessee from
liability for damages to the surface unless caused by gross negligence
and provides that pillars should be left sufficient to support the roof
so that at the expiration of the lease the mine shall be left in as good
condition for future mining as any prudent operator would leave the
same were he entitled to continue mining for a series of years, it was
held that there was a waiver of the right to support. 26 On the other
hand, the lessee is under a duty to furnish support in the absence of
an express waiver thereof, and the mere fact that the lease demises
all the coal and requires the lessee to mine by the most economical
22

The determination of what constitutes a waiver of subjacent support in
the severance deed, or otherwise than in a lease, is beyond the scope of this
article.
2
3 In Pennsylvania, the right of subjacent support is a "third estate", an
interest in real property, and may be owned independently of the surface and
of the coal. If so owned, a release or waiver may be obtained from the owner.
Chartnetski v. Miner's Mills Coal Mining Co., 270 Pa. 459, 113 Ad. 683 (1921);
Smith v. Glen Alden Coal Co., 847 Pa. 290, 32 A.2d 227 (1943).
24 Miles v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 214 Pa. 544, 63 Ad. 1032 (1906);
Boyer v. Old Ben Corp., 229 IM. App. 56 (1923).
25 Miles v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 217 Pa. 449, 66 Ad. 764, 10 Ann. Cas.
871 (1907). The provision refers only to the temporary leaving of pillars
during the course of mining the main body of the coal.
26 Miles v. New York, Susquehanna & Western Coal Co., 250 Pa. 147,
95 Ad. 397 (1915). The stipulation for leaving pillars was held to refer to a
termination of the lease before the removal of all the coal so that future operations could be conducted; and that a stipulation for careful and skillful mining
does not require the lessee to support the surface.
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method does not constitute a waiver or release of the duty.2 7 In such
a case, the duty is enforceable by a subsequent vendee of the lessor
notwithstanding that the vendee's deed recited that the pillars had
28
been removed by the lessee.
B. Duty owing to third person owning the overlying strata. In
the following discussion the cases involve situations in which there
has been a severance in title of the coal from the overlying strata
and no waiver or release of the right to support. The lessee of the
coal removes the support and the question is whether or not he is
liable to the surface owner, whether the lessor is liable, or whether
they are jointly liable.
(1) Liability of the lessee. The right to support is a "natural
right", the duty to provide support is absolute, and it is not a defense
that the mining was conducted with due skill and care and in the
most approved manner. 29 There can be no doubt, therefore, that
the lessee is liable for the failure to leave supporting pillars or artificial substitutes in lieu thereof.
(2) Liability of the lessor. There is a conflict of authority as
to whether or not the lessor is liable to the surface owner for damages caused by the removal of support 0 by the lessee. In Campbell
v. Louisville Coal Mining Co.,3 1 the lease provided that the lessee

should mine in a workmanlike manner, and the lessor reserved the
right to inspect the mine. The lessor's agents knew that the lessee
was removing the natural support and was not substituting artificial
supports. The lessor made no efforts to prevent mining in such a
manner and accepted royalties resulting therefrom. The court upheld a recovery against the lessor, holding that such mining was
27

Lenox Coal Co. v. Duncan-Spangler Coal Co., 265 Pa. 572, 109 AUt.

282 (1920). See also, Lewis v. Steward, 204 Okla. 349, 230 P.2d 455 (1952).
Nor is there a waiver by a provision that the mining shall be by "methods as
are best calculated to prevent" subsidence. Peters v. Bellingham Coal Mines,
173 Wash. 128, 21 P.2d 1024 (1933).
28

ibid.

29Alabama Clay Products v. Black, 215 Ala. 170, 110 So. 151 (1926).
Even though the lessee is under no duty to support the surface, he may be
liable for wanton or malicious damage to it. Elkhorne Coal Corp. v. Johnson,
263 S.W.2d 124 (Ky. 1954).
30 The same principles apply to the removal of lateral support in connection with coal mining. School District of Borough of Shenandoah v. City of
Philadelphia, 367 Pa. 180, 79 A.2d 433 (1951).
3139 Colo. 379, 89 Pac. 767, 10 L.R1A. (ns.) 822 (1907). It was also
held that a statute permitting the surface owner to require the mineral owner
to give bond to secure the surface owner against damages, does not discharge
the duty of the mineral owner by failure of the surface owner to require such
bond.
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negligence; that the lessor cannot do indirectly that which the law
prohibits him from doing directly. "One cannot knowingly reap the
benefit of a wrong and escape the liabilities resulting from such
wrong." The principle applied is that "whoever, for his own advantage, authorizes his property to be used by another in such a manner
as to unnecessarily endanger and injure the property of others is
answerable for the consequences.... The case does not fall within
the general rule to the effect that the lessor of premises is not
liable for the negligence of his lessee, because, ordinarily, the lessor
does not retain, and is under no obligation to retain, control over the
demised premises." This view has received the approval of the Kentucky court which, on a similar state of facts, held that the lessor is
liable if he authorizes or permits the lessee to remove supporting
pillars, takes no steps to prevent it, and accepts benefits in the form
32
of royalties.
In Alabama Clay Products v. Black,33 the Alabama court refused to follow the Campbell case in so far as the latter held that the
receipt of royalties by the lessor was a basis for the imposition of
liability, stating: "the mere receipt of a royalty for the mineral even
if the [lessor] knows of the mining operations would not authorize
or require him to interfere and control simply because he may have
been the owner of the mineral, in the absence of the reservation of
the right to do so under the terms of the lease." The court further
held that ordinarily the lessee and not the lessor is liable for a subsidence caused by mining operations over which the lessee is in
full control. However, if the lessor reserves the right to direct or
control the mining operations of the lessee and gives directions as to
the taking of coal from the pillars, he is liable to the owner of the
surface for the resulting injury. And, it has been held that if the
lessor directs the lessee to remove the support, both lessor and lessee
are liable; but if the lessee has full control over the manner of mining, he alone is liable. 34 The lessor is liable where the lease contemplates and expressly authorizes the lessee to rob the pillars and
leave the surface without support; and this result is unaffected by a
provision in the lease that the lessee would secure written releases
from the surface owners and would indemnify the lessor against any
35
claims for damages.
32 Nisbet v. Lofton, 211 Ky. 487, 277 S.W. 828 (1925).
33215 Ala. 170, 110 So. 151 (1926).
34

Kistler v. Thompson, 158 Pa. 139, 27 AUt. 874 (1893).
218 Ala. 369, 118 So. 749 (1928).

35 Republic Iron & Steel Co. v. Barter,
Note, 77 U. OF PA. L. REv. 703 (1929).
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The Pennsylvania court has rather strictly limited the liability
of the lessor. Irrespective of whether the instrument constitutes a
sale or a lease, neither the vendor nor the lessor is responsible in
trespass for the negligent mining by the vendee or lessee which
results in damage to the surface; and the reservation in the lease by
the lessor of the right to inspect the mine does not make him a director of the mining operation, nor constitute an aiding or abetting
of the operation of the lessee, nor establish that the removal of the
pillars was under the supervision, direction and control of the lessor.3 6 The inference to be drawn is that the vendor or lessor would
be liable if he did actively direct or participate in the removal of the
support. Upon procedural grounds, the court refused to decide
whether or not the vendor or lessor could be held liable for negligence in enteringinto the lease when he knew or should have known
that the mine was practically exhausted and that the removal of
further coal would cause subsidence and the withdrawal of sup37
port
It is submitted that the Colorado view is the sound one where
a true lease, as distinguished from a sale, of the coal is involved. The
surface owner has the absolute right to support and the lessor-owner
of the coal is under an absolute duty to leave natural support or an
adequate substitute for it. If the lessee fails to provide support and
he is insolvent or judgment against him is otherwise uncollectible,
it is unjust and unreasonable that the surface owner must submit
to the damage or destruction of his property without a remedy
against the person who owed to him the absolute duty of protection
and whose voluntary act in executing the lease made it possible for
the loss to occur. If the lessor cannot himself directly remove the
support without incurring liability, upon what principle may he do
so indirectly through the medium of a legal device called a lease?
There is no magic in a name. If the courts desire to impose liability
upon the lessor, there is no insurmountable technical difficulty involved and several alternative theories may be advanced. (1) In
the absence of a provision in the lease requiring the lessee to support
the surface, the court can create a constructive covenant to do so.
(2) The lease contains an express covenant by the lessee to provide
support. In either case it should be held that the lessor is under a
duty to determine from time to time as the mining progresses
36

School District of Borough of Shenandoah v. City of Philadelphia,

867 Pa. 180, 79 A.2d 438 (1951).

The case involved the removal of lateral

support, but the principle is the same.
37

Ibid.
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whether or not the covenant is being violated, and if so to take such
steps as may be necessary in order to prevent it, by injunction 38 or
by forfeiture for breach under an express forfeiture clause. (3) If
the lease does not expressly or by implication restrict the removal of
support, the lessor should be held liable for having thereby authorized the use of his property in such a manner as to injure the
property of the surface owner.
It may be contended, in opposition to the foregoing position,
that since the vendor of a seam of coal is not liable to the surface
owner for the removal of support by the vendee, and that since for
many purposes a lease is merely a legal device for effecting a sale
of the coal upon an instalment basis, a lessor should incur no greater
liability than that incurred by a vendor. 39 The answer to this
contention is that in all legal relationships involving a right-duty
concept the courts must determine the identity of the party who
owes the duty. And, especially in instances where that duty is an
absolute one, as in support cases, it is attached to ownership of the
supporting strata. Consequently, the holder of the title in fee to it is
necessarily identified as the party who owes the duty. If he would
escape it he must part with the ownership, with its benefits and its
burdens. He should not be permitted to retain the advantages presumably connected with ownership and to escape the liabilities inseparably incident to it, by vesting a lesser estate in another. Therefore, it is submitted, there is a valid, realistic basis for making a distinction between the legal duties of a vendor and those of a lessor,
IV.
It will be observed that in each of the three types of cases which
have been previously discussed, namely, liability for blasting, liability for stream pollution, and liability for removal of subjacent support, it has been suggested that the better view is that the rule of
absolute liability should be imposed.
38
As to the circumstances under which some courts will issue an injunction against the withdrawal of support, see VI-A AmmcAN LAw oF PROPEuTY
§28.53 (1954). The extent to which liability may exist by reason of the existence or construction of buildings upon the surface is beyond the scope of this
article. See Annot., 82 A.L.R.2d 1309 (1953). Where a lease contemplates the
removal of minerals which the lessor does not own, he is liable to the true
owner for trespasses committed by the lessee. Annot., 127 A.L.R. 1020 (1940).
But not if the lease amounts to a mere quitclaim. Greek Catholic Congregation
v. Plummer, 388 Pa. 373, 12 A.2d 435, 127 A.L.R. 1008 (1940).
39 See note 36 supra.
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The fourth, and last, type of case to be discussed concerns the
liability imposed upon coal operators in connection with the maintenance of gob piles.
The maintenance of "gob piles" in close proximity to coal tipples is a common practice. These piles consist of rock, slate, sulphur
balls, inferior coal and other materials separated from the merchantable portion of the coal. When the piles reach a large size, the pressure of these materials creates heat which often results in spontaneous combusion, producing the emanation of quite noxious fumes of
sulphur dioxide and perhaps other gases. In Rinehart v. Stanley Coal
Co., 40 the court held that an operator who creates such a gob pile

and thereafter deposits on it "bug dust" (fine particles of coal resulting from the operation of cutting machines), knowing that fire
would likely result because of its highly combustible nature, is
guilty of actionable negligence which renders him liable to a neighboring landowner for damages sustained to crops, fruit trees, fences
and dwelling houses by reason of the destructive effect thereon of
fumes produced by such combustion. The duty of the operator to
remove the bug dust from the interior of the mine, in response to
orders from a state mine inspector, does not permit him "to create a
private nuisance in the negligent disposal of a potentially dangerous substance."
In the case of Koch v. Eastern Gas & Fuel Associates,4 1 the
plaintiffs instituted an action of trespass on the case to recover damages to their property caused by fumes emanating from a gob pile
maintained by the defendant. The cause of action was based upon
the allegation of negligence in the operation and maintenance of the
gob piles. Disregarding the procedural questions raised as to duplicity in the defendant's pleas, the court held that the plea that the
defendant had acquired a prescriptive right to maintain the gob pile
was demurrable because it did not allege the elements of adverse
and continuous user during the statutory period, i.e., that the plea
did not allege when the gob piles became ignited and continued to
burm.
The defendant also filed a plea of assumption of risk The court
held that this plea was properly interposed, and that the trial court
40112W. Va. 82,163 S.E. 766 (1932). Note, 40 W. VA. L.Q. 371 (1934).
This paragraph is a reprint from

DONLEY, LAW OF CoAL, OiL & GAS IN W. VA.

& VA. (1951), and is reprinted with the permission of the publishers, The
Michie Co., Charlottesville, Va.
4195 S.E.2d 822 (W. Va. 1956).
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erred in sustaining a demurrer to it, but the court went on to say:
"Of course, as the allegations of the declaration in the case at bar
are to the effect that the alleged wrongdoings on the part of the defendant trust association are progressive and continuing, the plea of
assumption of risk cannot be employed to bar damages to the plaintiffs which have accrued since the plaintiffs moved into and on their
property, and after the trust association had been notified or by the
exercise of reasonable care should have known, of the injurious
effects of its gob pile or gob piles."
This confusing statement seems to mean that the plaintiffs
could not recover for any damages which their property had suffered
prior to their moving into their property, but could recover damages which were sustained thereafter; but it is noted that this right
of action was said not to accrue until after the defendant either knew
or should have known of the injurious effect of the fumes. No
authority was cited in support of this proposition, and it seems to be
the theory of the decision that the maintenance of a gob pile which
is emanating noxious fumes is not in itself an act of negligence, but
becomes so only when damage to another results therefrom.
The court went on to say: "Though the continuing trespasses
alleged in the instant declaration may, in fact, constitute a private
nuisance, the case was not submitted to this Court on that theory.
Whether -thealleged continuing trespasses were, in fact, a nuisance,
the cause of action did not arise until the injury had actually occurred. 2 Wood on Nuisances, 3rd Ed., Section 719." This citation
is not authority for the proposition for which it is cited, for the
reason that the text of that section of Wood on Nuisances deals with
the acquisition of a presciptive right to maintain a nuisance, and
with reference thereto the author states that such prescriptive right
begins to run from the time the actual injury results from the user.
The court insisted upon the distinction that "the case at bar
under the averments of the instant declaration was drafted by lawyers skilled in the common law practice of this State, for the purpose of bringing this case within the category of an action of trespass on the case for the purpose of recovering damages for continuing trespasses, resulting in injury or damage, as distinguished from
an action to recover temporary damages from a private nuisance."
In the case of Oresta v. Romano Bros.,42 the court held that a
42 137

W. Va. 633, 73 S.E.2d 622 (1952).
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coal stripper was guilty of actionable negligence in depositing waste
material in such a manner as to cause it -to be cast upon adjoining
land, and that this amounted to the maintenance of a nuisance.
It is apparent that negligent acts may result in the creation of a
nuisance, but once the nuisance is created, the liability of the defendant is absolute and whether the action is to recover for temporary damages or for permanent damages affects only the measure
thereof and not the substantive liability.
It is, therefore, not readily apparent why there was such an insistence upon making the distinction in the Koch case between a
cause of action based upon negligence and a cause of action based
upon a nuisance when, as demonstrated by the Oresta case, the
negligence results in the production of a nuisance, the result is the
same.
A recent and excellent treatise 43 states:
"Many wrongs which are loosely called nuisance depend
entirely upon the negligence of the actor. In an important case,
of Appeals.
on the are
New
York Court
Justice
Cardozo,
when
by ordicontrolled
properly
nuisances
that such
emphasized
nary doctrines of the law of negligence notwithstanding the
name of nuisance is applied to them. 'Situations there are,' he
observed, where what was lawfu in its origin may be turned
into a nuisance by negligence in maintenance. The coal hole,
built under a license, may involve a liability for nuisance if
there is negligence in covering it. The tumbledown house
abutting on a highway is transformed into an unlawful structure
if its ruinous condition is a menace to the traveler. In these and
like situations, the danger being a continuing one, is often characterized as a nuisance, though dependent upon negligence.
"But there are many instances of nuisance which do not
depend upon negligence for their wrongful character, and
it is such nuisance that concerns us here. In this type of nuisance, it is immaterial that the defendant has employed all reasonable precautions to avoid harm to the plaintiff for the plaintiff does not rely upon the existence of a duty imposed by law
to exercise care. Consequently the breach of such a duty is
not of controlling significance....
"The Restatement, however, is clearly on sound ground in
attributing many nuisances to conduct which is negligent (or
reckless) or ultra-hazardous. It is obvious that many activities
are carried on with lack of precautions to prevent interference
with others so great as to constitute negligence. When this
43 1 HARpER & JAMES, TORTS 66

(1956).
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interference substantially restricts others in the lawful use of
their land, there is liability for nuisance. In many such cases,
the usual continuity of interference is not required. It is enough
that the interference is 'substantial,' although, of course, continuity of interference may be an important factor in determining
the 'substantiality thereof.44
"It may be said, as a general proposition, that the doctrine of voluntary assumption of risk has no application in
nuisance cases to relieve from liability. Thus it is no defense
to an action for nuisance that the plaintiff 'came to the nuisance'

by knowingly acquiring property in the vicinity of the defend-

ant's premises. The maxim volenti non fit injuria, said Sir

John Salmond, is capable of no such application and, indeed, it
has been held that the same result is proper where the nuisance

complained of arose out of negligence. The duty to use due
care, it seems, is not abated toward one who has elected to live
or reside in the vicinity of the nuisance.
"But while 'coming to the nuisance' is not, in and of itself,
a defense, priority in use is one of the factors which is important
in determining whether a particular use constitutes a nuisance.
Thus, if a person builds or buys a residence in a neighborhood
which is predominantly industrial, the fact that he is annoyed
by adjoining factories does not give him a cause of action for
nuisance. So too, if he builds his home near an airport or a
these activities do not immediately become
railroad track,
45
nuisances."

In the case of Board of Commissioners v. Elm Grove Mining
Co.,46 the court upheld the power of municipalities or county
courts, under the provisions of the Code, to abate nuisances affecting
public health by securing an injunction restraining the addition of
combustible substances to a burning gob pile.
In that case a brief was filed by the West Virginia Coal Association, which took the position that such an injunction would "decree
from existence the mining of coal in this State." The court, speaking by Judge Maxwell, stated that it did not share that alarm, and
went on to say that: "But public health comes first. Even in as useful and important industry as the mining of coal, an incidental consequence, such as here involved, cannot be justified or permitted
unqualifiedly, if the health of the public is impaired thereby. Notwithstanding a business be conducted in the regular manner, yet if
in the operation thereof, it is shown by facts and circumstances to
44

Id. at 68-69.

45 Id.at 83.

46 122 W. Va. 442, 9 S.E.2d 813 (1940).
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constitute a nuisance affecting public health 'no measure of necessity
usefulness or public benefit will protect it from the unflinching condemnation of the law."'
It is interesting to observe also that in the Koch case, previously
mentioned, the contention was again made on behalf of the West
Virginia Coal Association that it is a matter of general knowledge in
this state that the mining of coal cannot be sucessfully carried on
without the use of gob piles, and that it is a natural, necessary and
unavoidable incident to the ordinary and proper mining of coal,
and that it is the very nature of gob piles to catch fire by spontaneous combustion, and that regardless of care and caution they will
catch fire and once ignited they cannot be extinguished by any
practical means now known.
The accuracy of that contention may be seriously questioned.
It is a matter of fact that one of the largest mines now operating in
northern West Virginia has eliminated gob piles by bulldozing earth
over waste material.
But even if the contention of the Coal Association is sound, as a
matter of fact, it is submitted that it should not justify the injury or
destruction of neighboring property without liability. If, as previously shown, injury to or destruction of neighboring property is
caused by blasting, or the force of concussions, it is difficult to see
any valid distinction between that class of cases and those in which
injury is caused by the impact of noxious fumes transmitted through
the air.
To summarize, then: It is submitted that in all the four types
of cases, namely, blasting, stream pollution, removal of subjacent
support, and the maintenance of gob piles, courts should impose an
absolute liability. The fundamental basis for this belief is that in
the middle of the twentieth century we should not be bound by the
narrow concept of fault principles, which were developed in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, in a much more primitive and
nonindustrial society; and that the courts should be prompted by
policy considerations emerging from the idea of the inviolability of
private property rights, and the notion that expanding industry, now
largely in the hands of great corporations having ample resources,
should make good the loss caused to innocent bystanders in the
roles of nearby property owners.
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